报告题目：Investment and financing for cash flow discounted with group diversity

报 告 人：杨招军（南方科技大学，金融系副教授、副系主任）

时      间：2017年11月24日（周五）下午2:30-4:00

地      点：岭南堂黄炳礼会议室

语      言：英文+中文

摘要：

We consider a firm's investment and financing decisions made by a group in which every individual may utilize different discount rates to price contingent claims. We provide the closed-form prices for the firm's securities and the pricing and timing of the option to invest. We study the impacts of the decreasing impatience and group diversity on the investment and financial policies. We find that a higher degree of decreasing impatience or a greater group diversity increases the project value, accelerating investment and postponing default. The value of the investment option increases with the degree of the decreasing impatience but it is ambiguous as group diversity rises. The optimal leverage increases with the decreasing impatience and lessens if group diversity reduces. The inefficiency from asset substitution increases with the decreasing impatience but it first increases and then decreases as group diversity gets weaker. These findings are partly documented by empirical evidences.                              

报告人简介：

杨招军2016年4月全职加入南方科技大学，现为金融系副教授、副系主任、博士生导师，深圳市鹏城学者长期特聘教授（金融学）、深圳市高层次人才。曾为湖南大学三级教授、博士生导师，国家重点学科学术带头人之一，国家自然科学基金创新群体主要成员。曾获湖南省优秀博士论文指导老师、湖南省优秀硕士论文指导老师、湖南大学科研标兵等荣誉。在国际知名SSCI源刊发表大量论文，研究方向为金融工程、金融理论、科技金融。现担任Cogent Economics and Finance等杂志编委。

第438期Seminar

金融学系列

报告题目：Advisors Lending to the Advised Acquirer as a Last Resort

报 告 人：Xueping Wu（香港城市大学 副教授）

时      间：2017年11月24日（周五）下午16:00-17:30

地      点：岭南堂黄炳礼会议室

语     言：中文+英文

Abstract:

It has become apparent in recent decades that acquirers’ financial advisors also participate in financing the M&A they advise on. These advisor-led syndicated loans have unusually high spreads. The advisor’s dual role (advisory and financing) also seems to reduce the acquirer’s M&A announcement effect. All of this could reflect a conflict of interest where financial advisors would abet corporate overinvestment to share in rents arising from managerial empire building, undermining the information production and certification roles of banks in loan financing. However, our analysis reveals that post-M&A underperformance is absent for these acquirers, and their need for external finance to complete ambitious acquisitions justifies premium pricing in advisor dual-role lending. The investment banks act as last-resort lenders in these big-ticket deals.

报告人介绍：

Dr. Xueping Wu is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and Finance of the City University of Hong Kong. His research interests are both theoretical and empirical, covering Corporate Finance, Asset Pricing and Capital Markets, and International Finance. He has published papers in high quality academic journals including the Journal of Business and JFQA. He has won several best paper awards including the 1999-WFA Award for the Best Paper in Corporate Finance. His recent research agenda is to try to establish a theory of growth type compatibility in corporate finance – a theory that explains why firms grow and seek financing in a persistent way under asymmetric informational environments. He is also working on how financial intermediaries such as financial advisors help mitigate market imperfection.

岭南学术论坛论坛

中山大学岭南学术论坛分经济、金融和管理三个系列，定期邀请国内外优秀学者前来开展学术交流。每系列每个月定期举办2-3次。目前已经成功举办多期，并得到了各界的高度评价。

论坛主页：http://www.lingnan.net/seminar

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