【MBAChina网讯】华人学者营销协会第六届中国市场营销国际学术年会（China Marketing International Conference 2018）将于2018年7月20-22日在上海财经大学举行。

会议以“智慧营销：人、技术与创新”为主题，由华人学者营销协会、上海财经大学商学院、上海市市场学会共同主办。

CMIC设有9个特邀分论坛，分别代表营销研究和实践领域的9个专题。大会邀请与主题相关的优秀青年学者和业界人士进行专题分享和交流。这些分会场时间安排在7月21日和7月22日下午，欢迎您选择自己感兴趣的专题前往。

今天，为大家介绍第八辑内容。

第八辑零售和渠道管理分会

7月22日 下午15:30-19:00

大会现场通知

分会主席

周晨希(厦门大学)、孙炯(普渡大学)

演讲人介绍

周晨希

周晨希现任厦门大学管理学院助理教授。他于美国佛罗里达大学商学院获得市场营销学博士。

他的研究兴趣包括国际营销、营销战略和行为经济建模。他的博士论文已发表在Journal of International Business Studies 杂志。周博士目前最新研究问题包括：零售行业销售信息披露，中美跨国并购的比较研究，预售模型与供应链管理。周博士教授营销学原理和客户关系管理等课程。

徐子彬

徐子彬现任上海交通大学安泰管理学院市场学助理教授，2017年毕业于南加州大学马歇尔商学院，获得管理学博士学位。他还获得过统计学硕士学位和计算科学学士学位，并曾在堪城密苏里大学进行过战略创新与创业管理方向的博士学习。他曾获得南加州大学年度最佳博士授课奖。

他的研究兴趣是使用经济学模型分析企业定价与竞争策略，消费者信息传播，产品创新与设计，以及互联网平台的治理。他的研究成果曾发表在IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management。

高月涛

高月涛现任厦门大学管理学院助理教授。他是新加坡国立大学管理学博士。他曾在长江商学院担任过案例研究员。

他的研究兴趣是打假和行为经济学在市场营销的应用。他的博士论文已被Marketing Science接受，即将发表。

刘国伟

刘国伟现任河北工业大学经济管理学院工业工程系讲师。他毕业于天津大学，获得管理学博士学位，并曾在美国伊利诺伊大学香槟分校Gies商学院做联合培养博士。

刘博士的研究兴趣在于供应链管理以及市场营销与运营管理的交叉研究。他的研究成果发表在Omega, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research等期刊上。 刘博士的最新研究方向包括: 消费者公平关切行为对企业竞争定价的影响，以及基于社会责任的企业产品创新与定价策略研究。

分享内容摘要

周晨希教授的分享主题

The Curious Case of Withdrawn Comparable Store Sales Disclosures: An Empirical Investigation of the Retailing Industry

Juncai Jiang

Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech

Chenxi Zhou*

School of Management, Xiamen University

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

Since the late 1990s, many retailers have ceased disclosing their monthly comparable store sales (CSS) metrics, which is notable considering modern demands for information transparency. Drawing on economics, finance, and marketing literatures, we propose four potential reasons for the withdrawal of CSS disclosure: (1) avoidance of competitive information leakage, (2) concealment of poor performance, (3) decreased relevance of the metrics, and (4) prevention of management myopia. Testable hypotheses reflecting each plausible reason are tested using a unique dataset of publicly-traded retailers, spanning two decades between 1995 and 2015. The results indicate that retailers halt CSS disclosure in order to avoid information leakage towards competitors while other potential reasons lack empirical support. Specifically, retailers facing fierce competition, with undiversified customer assets, and that sell products with long life cycles are likely to limit their CSS disclosure. An event study analysis reveals that investors generally reward this withdrawal decision, and retailers in more competitive markets and with less diversified customer assets receive higher abnormal returns.

徐子彬教授的分享主题

Product Line Design with Superior Information on Consumers’ Preferences: Implications of Data Aggregation

Zibin Xu*

Antai College of Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Anthony Dukes

Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

With the explosion of data collection technologies, a firm may learn superior information on consumers’ preferences, especially when consumers have imperfect prior knowledge of their marginal utility for product quality. This research examines the welfare implications of product line design with superior information: Do consumers receive better fitting products or simply have more surplus extracted? Is learning superior information ever unprofitable? We examine a scenario in which data aggregation creates superior information on consumers’ preferences beyond consumers’ prior knowledge. Consumers’ rational suspicion, however, may confound the firm’s ability to price discriminate using the superior information. We find that product line design with superior information may lead to a strict Pareto optimal outcome for both the firm and every consumer. In addition, the firm may lower the price of the high-quality product and raise the quality of the low-quality product. This tends to reverse the classic quality distortion and thus restore the efficiency in product line design.

高月涛教授的分享主题

Service-Switching Infomediaries

Yuetao Gao*

School of Management, Xiamen University

Wei Shi Lim

National University of Singapore

Xiaoyan Xu

National University of Singapore

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

In some service industries (e.g., credit cards, mobile phone plans, insurance), many consumers do not carry the service plan that best fits their needs. Recently, service-switching infomediaries have entered the market and consumers can locate better service plans by using websites' free service if the infomediaries can reach them. An infomediary is an Internet-based information provider that gathers information about consumers' preferences based on their existing consumption behaviors and recommends service providers to them; however, the choices are restricted to only the service providers enrolled with the infomediary. We examine how provision of information by an infomediary affects service providers' profits and consumer surplus. We find that when a large proportion of uninformed consumers are not matched with their ideal service, the infomediary profits by adopting a non-exclusive contract to enroll all service providers. In addition, enrolling with the infomediary is a dominant strategy for service providers. However, they may consequently realize less profit. Furthermore, we show that although the infomediary intends to provide information such that consumers can make a better service choice, consumers are worse off if the reach of the infomediary to uninformed consumers is high. Consumers are better off if the reach is low.

刘国伟讲师的分享主题

Do Consumer Fairness Concerns Soften Price Competition? The Role of Declining Costs

Guowei Liu*

School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology

Yunchuan Liu

Gies College of Business, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign

Jiong Sun

Department of Consumer Science, Purdue University

Jianxiong Zhang

College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University, Tianjin, China

*Presenting Author

Abstract:

Firms enjoy declining cost per unit of output with increasing cumulative output in a variety of industries, which gives rise to consumer concerns about transaction fairness. Consumers are less likely to purchase from a firm if it continues to reap an unfairly high profit margin. Intuitively, such consumer fairness concerns will induce firms to lower their prices. We develop an analytical framework to show, however, that firms may set higher prices with increasing consumer fairness concerns in the presence of competition. The indirect effect that consumer fairness concerns soften price competition caused by cost reductions dominates the direct effect that they intensify price competition caused by product substitution, when the cost-declining impact is sufficiently strong. Moreover, whether consumer fairness concerns increase or decrease social welfare also depends on the strength of the cost-declining effect. We also show the robustness of our main results by extending our model to a channel setting with quantity-discount con- tracts.

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